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Special Issue on the Third Workshop on Biological Mentality
Kenneth A. Augustyn
Department of Physics
Michigan Technological University, Houghton Michigan, 49931 USA
kaaugust@mtu.edu

Abstract
The Third Workshop on Biological Mentality was held from September 23,
2019 to March 2, 2020 as a series of twenty-one Monday online conferencing
sessions, each consisting of a talk followed by a Q&A discussion. Like the two
previous workshops [1, 2], the objective of this workshop was to seek a deeper
level of understanding the physical foundations of biological mentality (whether
conscious or nonconscious).
Keywords: Biological mentality, Mind-matter, Consciousness

1. Introduction
Is our understanding of the brain unduly constrained by the computer
metaphor? Is data processing sufficient to explain the mentality of living
organisms? Is a living organism essentially the same as a robot with
artificial intelligence, or is there something more? Are quantum coherent
processes present throughout the brain and if so how do they relate to
mentality?
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These are some of the questions the workshop addressed in talks and
discussions across the boundaries of many different disciplines with the
goal of Improving our understanding of biological mentality.
This paper contains the Program for the workshop and brief statements
by some of the speakers.
Also in this Special Issue are papers from workshop participants Asim
Islam, Alin Cucu, Stuart Kauffman, and Kenneth Augustyn. The previous
issue, J. Cog. Sci. 21:2, contained a paper from participants John Myers and
F. Hadi Madjid.

2. Program
Date

Speaker

9/23/2019

Alin Cucu

9/30/2019

Kenneth Augustyn

10/7/2019

John Myers

10/14/2019

J. Brian Pitts

10/21/2019 Gustav Bernroider
10/28/2019 Kenneth Augustyn
11/4/2019

J. Brian Pitts

11/11/2019

Brian Josephson

11/18/2019

Robert Prentner

11/25/2019

Marcus Appleby

12/2/2019

Kenneth Augustyn

Title
“Energy Conservation, Physicalism and the
Prospects for Interactionist Dualism”
“Life Transcended Computing before the
Emergence of Consciousness”
“Word Sequencing”
“Conservation Laws and the Philosophy of
Mind”
“Bright and Dark Physics: A Dual Aspect
Physicalistic Interpretation of Biological
Mentality”
“Why the Whole Idea of “Passing the Turing
Test” is Damaging Western Civilization”
“General Relativity, Energy Conservation,
and Mental Causation: Carroll’s Foundling”
“Towards a New Scientific Paradigm”
“Where is the Mentality in Biological
Mentality?”
“Quantum Mechanics and the Problem of
Consciousness”
“Why I like Penrose and Hameroff but
don't like Orch OR”
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12/9/2019

Alin Cucu

1/6/2020

Andrew F. Knight

1/13/2020

Art Hobson

1/20/2020

Robert Prentner

1/27/2020

Ted Goodson

2/3/2020

Gustav Bernroider

2/10/2020

Jack Tuszynski

2/17/2020

Asim Islam

2/24/2020
3/2/2020

Stuart Kauffman
Brian Josephson
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“Does QM Help Model Dualistic Mental
Interaction?”
“Why Mind Uploading, Brain Copying,
and Conscious Computers are Impossible”
“The Entangled Measurement State is not a
Paradoxical Superposition of the Detector”
“Phenomenal and Psychological Concepts
of Consciousness”
“Entangled Photon Absorption Applications
in Biology”
“Cause and Effect in Biology, Causality in
Physics and the Problem of Consciousness”
“Computational Capabilities and Limitations
of the Human Brain based on Microtubule
Involvement at a Sub Neuronal Level”
“Many-body Quantum Field Models for
Nonlinear Brain Dynamics”
“Mind and Quantum Actualization”
“The Subtleties of Coordination”

Statements of Speaker Interests
Marcus Appleby

In physics it is well-known that finding the right question is often at least
50% of the difficulty. In my contribution I did not propose a solution to
the problem of consciousness, not even a tentative one. Rather I examined
the question. This is in the belief that the question is currently mis-posed.
The current conception of consciousness may be regarded as an attenuated
version of the Cartesian concept of mind. I argued that the Cartesian
philosophy was originally motivated by conceptual problems with Galilean
physics. Quantum mechanics changes things. This is not to say that the
problem of consciousness is a pseudo-problem, as is sometimes suggested.
It is, however, to say that the problem is not quite as is often assumed. In
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particular, it is argued that current conceptions encourage an unbalanced
conception of mentality, according to which the state of being barely awake
is the essence of what it is to be human, whereas the thought processes
which led Einstein to the general theory of relativity are something a
zombie could manage.
Kenneth Augustyn

What we call the mind began as a non-conscious robotic biochemical
process control system in the very earliest forms of life. As life evolved,
problems in control became more difficult and exceeded the computational
capabilities of the organisms. Nature discovered a means of transcending
computable physical processes giving rise to non-physical mental
capabilities that, while still not conscious, were no longer entirely physical.
Biological mentality began to have a degree of genuine autonomy from
the physical world, affecting the course of (but not the mechanism of)
evolution. The integrated amalgam of robotic and transrobotic unconscious
capabilities eventually gave rise to consciousness, which became an even
more important factor in the course of evolution.
The processes responsible for transrobotic mentality are conjectured
to leave evidence in the physical world in the form of violations of
conservation laws, evidence that future experiments may be able to detect.
Gustav Bernroider
Bright and Dark Physics:
A Dual Aspect Physicalistic Interpretation of Biological Mentality

Sentience is part of every living organism. It is at the root of life and at
the root of an object knowing, conscious subject. It seems that if ‘sentience’,
as the ability to ‘feel something’, is stripped of its cognitive part, taking
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away the (physical) organisation behind it, something very fundamental
still remains. We can probably agree to name this something the ‘qualia’ of
sentience. I suggest that the phenomenon of life is identical to the ‘qualia’
of sentience, i.e. that these two concepts are not just simply related to each
other, but are actually the same. Now the question arises how does physics
relate to this?
I think it makes sense to interpret physics as a descriptor for the
properties of nature that a sentient agent can capture. However, the
properties themselves seem to come up in two strictly opposing versions,
a duality originating from the same source, reminiscent to the traditional
mind-matter duality or subject/object dichotomy. Along this view a
Russelian interpretation, perhaps a version as suggested more recently by
Jiri Benowski within a ‘Dual Aspect Monism’ [1] is close to the present
conjecture. The difference to Benowskis proposal as I am arguing here is,
that the dualities building on one monistic (‘Agency’) source are not seen
in the tradition of Mind-Body dualism, but instead can both be situated
within an extended version of physics, a new kind of physics, compatible
with the properties of ‘closure’ but indicating a lack of completeness behind
its canonical version. I call the two opposing concepts in physics ‘bright’
and ‘dark’. The terms are purposely suggestive for the increasing demands
expressed by ‘bright physics’ to resolve open questions by referring to
some physical ‘dark side’ (as ‘dark matter’ or ‘dark energy’). This applies
particularly to physical situations instantiated at the far ends of scales, i.e. to
the low scale quantum level and to the large scale astrophysical level [2,3].
Here I focus on the nature of a relation between the suggested opposing
sides of physics as they emerge from one source of ‘agency’ or ‘qualia’ in
the above sense. Using tools from algebraic geometry, I am arguing that the
most radical relation between these dual aspects in physics is provided by a
sense relation or mirror symmetry. I provide examples from basic symmetry
relations and conservation laws in physics and eventually demonstrate
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unique sense-based organizations in biology, e.g. homo-chirality,
developmental neuro-psychology and biological chemistries. Furthermore,
it seems that these concepts extend into the cognitive-mathematical domain
where mirror symmetries precipitate into a basic distinction between what
is called ‘symplectic geometry’ on one side and complex geometry on
the other. These latter observations lead us into a question at the root of
idealism, about the source of cognitive concepts. In the line of this enduring
conundrum it is difficult to suggest a plausible route, but I do find many
similarities between the formal structure of cognitive concepts and the
structure of geometrical dynamics in our own brain organization. These
similarities lead me to assume that the way we think is tightly bound to the
way we are organized [5].
Taken together, the present concept shares many aspects with Augustyn’s
view on biological mentality [4], except one point. I do not consider the
most primitive forms of life, as for example apparent in prokaryotic
cells, as purely ‘robotic’. All life forms within the present view are ‘transrobotic’ in Augustyn’s sense, carrying the seeds of sentience, with or
without consciousness. However, the building up principle underlying
‘biological mentality’ as suggested in [4] shares many aspects with the view
I am proposing here. Perhaps, following and modifying Maturana’s and
Varela’s enactivistic principle [6], a sense relation between a subject and its
environment could serve as the organizational principle leading to a higher
cognitive (conscious) status of biological sentience.
[1] B
 enowski J 2016, Dual-aspect monism, Philosophical investigations,
39:4,335-352
[2] Perlmutter et al, Astrophysical J. 517, 565-568 (1999)
[3] R
 obert H. Sanders: The Dark Matter Problem. A Historical
Perspective. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010
[4] A
 ugustyn, K.A. Physical Foundations of Biological Mentality, Journal
of Cognitive Science (2019) 20(2): 195-214.

Special Issue on the Third Workshop on Biological Mentality

377

[5] Bernroider, G. 2017 J Integrative Neurosci 16, 105-113.
[6] V
 arela, F. (1984) In Ulrich, H., and Probst, G. (eds.), Self Organization
and the Management of Social Systems, Springer, Frankfurt.
Alin Christoph Cucu

Quantum mechanics (QM) has long been thought to be able to contribute
to the question how consciousness (construed non-physically) can be
causally efficacious in the physical world (interactive dualism). One idea
is that if non-physical mind interacts on the level of quantum processes, it
can bring about macroscopic changes without violating the principles of
momentum and energy conservation. However, energy and momentum
non-conservation is something physics can deal with (Cucu & Pitts 2019).
There is thus no impending clash with any law of nature that QM could
help avoid. But even if there were such a tension, QM would be no remedy,
since any collapse interpretation of QM entails momentum and energy nonconservation.
Of course, in light of this one might hold that the mind does work
through quantum processes although this entails momentum/energy nonconservation, the latter being unproblematic. As support, one might cite
the ‘consciousness collapse’ (CC) interpretation of QM, which claims
to explain our definite perceptions where quantum formalism predicts
superpositions. However, it turns out to be tricky to spell out exactly the
relation between states of the non-physical mind and brain states. Also, it
might be that CC is already empirically refuted (Yu & Nikolic 2011). The
position of CC is all the more weakened with the existence of at least one
QM interpretation which explains our observations without recourse to
extravagant metaphysics, namely Bohmian mechanics (BM). But BM does
not especially support interactive dualism (nor does it disadvantage it). This
does not mean, however, that interactive dualists can employ it cheerfully,
since any mental interaction entails a change in particle trajectory,
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probability distribution or other initial conditions of quantum processes.
It seems, therefore, that the real question interactive dualists must address
lies at a deeper level: namely the laws of nature. What is needed is a notion
of laws of nature that both does justice to the regularity in nature and the
apparent fact of pervasive mental interaction.
Art Hobson

I am working on various aspects of the quantum measurement problem,
within the context of standard quantum physics without various corrections
such as spontaneous collapse, and without specialized interpretations of
quantum physics such as the many worlds interpretation. My on-line talk
for the Center for the Physics of Living Organisms, titled “Entanglement
and the measurement problem," focused on the problem of definite
outcomes, also known as the Schroedinger’s cat problem. Here is the
abstract: An argument first proposed by John von Neumann shows that
measurement of a superposed quantum system creates an entangled
"measurement state" (MS) in which macroscopically distinct detector
states appear to be superposed, a paradoxical prediction implying the
measurement has no definite outcome. We argue that this prediction is
based on a misunderstanding of what the MS represents. We show, by
studying the phase dependence of entangled photon states generated in
parametric down conversion, that the MS represents not a superposition of
detector states, but rather a superposition of coherent (i.e. phase-dependent)
correlations between detector states and system states. In fact an argument
by Einstein shows that a nonlocal entangled state is required, at least briefly,
following a quantum system's interaction with a detector. Such a state does
not represent a paradoxical macroscopic superposition. This resolves the
paradox of indefinite outcomes of measurements.
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Asim Islam

The approach to employing quantum field theory for memory and
brain function was first pioneered by Umezawa and Ricciardi in 1967 by
comparing brain electrical activity with properties of condensed matter.
More formally, by examining the macroscopic properties of Bose gases
which arise from microscopic quantum phenomena it can be shown that
by extending the concept to many-body systems applied to thermofield
dynamics and condensed states it is a natural requirement to employ a
dual state. The notion of duality has been extended to a dissipative model
by Celeghini, Rasetti and Vitiello and has been further developed to an
extensive model for brain dynamics by Vitiello, Freeman, Jibu, Yasue and
others. Neuroscientific studies, based on this model, on humans and animals
by Freeman and Vitiello have provided new insights into the nature of
perception and cognition which for the first time relate electrical patterns
directly to thoughts and perception in a formal scientific manner amenable
to quantitative analysis.
The model is presently the most accurate predictor of the empirical
outcomes of a wide range of brain electrical activity and is of growing
interest amongst quantum physicists and neuroscientists. From a broader
perspective, it may also provide a deeper insight into the elusive nature
of human consciousness and proposals have been conjectured by Vitiello,
Freeman, Jibu and Yasue. Importantly there does not exist any suitable
alternative neural network based model which can adequately explain the
empirical data. We review the key elements of the many-body quantum
brain model with an emphasis on providing a sound physical basis for the
approach and providing compelling rationale for pursuing the model.
Brian Josephson

I argued a long time ago (Found. Phys. 18, 1195-204 (1988), at
arXiv:1110.1768) that quantum mechanics has a restricted scope, the way
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the state of a system is specified being adequate only in a limited class
of situations, which include those addressed in the kind of experiments
carried out by physicists, but not those concerning the biological and
cognitive sciences. Developments in the latter areas of investigation such
as biosemiotics and coordination dynamics offer the possibility of an
alternative fundamental basis for science. It is not completely inappropriate
to suggest that approaches by physicists involving the attempt to discover
a ’theory of everything’ based on a set of equations have passed their ‘best
before’ date. My talk, The Subtleties of Coordination, can be viewed at this
link: https://sms.cam.ac.uk/media/3179345.
Andrew Knight

The assumption of algorithmic consciousness implies the ability of
conscious states to be copied, leading to a variety of seeming paradoxes,
including the problems of duplication/teleportation, simulation, self-location,
and the Boltzmann Brain, among others. Despite notable exceptions, few
physicists or computer scientists question the assumption that consciousness
can be copied or simulated by a computer. In an effort to further elucidate
the physical nature of consciousness, I challenge these assumptions by
analyzing the implications of special relativity on evolutions of identical
copies of a conscious state, particularly the divergence of these evolutions
due to quantum fluctuations. By assuming the supervenience of a conscious
state on some sufficient underlying physical state, I show that the existence
of two or more spacelike instances of the same conscious state leads to a
logical contradiction if their respective evolutions depend on independent
quantum events; moreover, if evolutions of those instances do not depend
on independent quantum events, then quantum no-cloning prevents the
existence of more than one copy. I further show that the existence of two or
more timelike instances of the same conscious state leads to a comparable
logical contradiction, leading ultimately to a refutation of the assumption
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that a conscious state can be physically reset to an earlier state or duplicated
by any physical means. This conclusion further refutes the notions of mind
uploading or simulation, algorithmic or machine consciousness, and Strong
Artificial Intelligence.
John Myers/Hadi Madjid

As James Peebles put it in his 2019 Nobel Lecture: in the natural sciences
“[W]e operate on the postulate that nature operates by rules that we can
discover; that's only a postulate---we have no guarantee that that's how
nature works---but very productive.” Rules, once discovered, permit
predictions.
But life in and outside of science is hardly predictable; we all experience
surprises. Automotive engineers try to sort out the predictable from the
unpredictable; they do not try to predict the route that an automobile will
follow over its lifetime; rather, they design it with a steering wheel while
also making use of discovered regularities in the strength of steel and the
reaction times of people.
Following a proof of the essential non-uniqueness of explanations
described in [J. Cog. Sci. 20-2:229-249, 2019], we depart from custom by
assigning unpredictability a central place in physics, thereby giving more
emphasis to unpredictable agents, including people and other creatures. As
an area of application we point out that: agents experiencing unpredictable
events need to communicate with one another. They do so as agents by
transmitting unpredictable symbols from one to another. We begin to
explore mechanisms of symbol handling available to unpredictable agents,
and in particular the mutual regulation of rhythms of symbol handling
essential to communication of symbols. A recent finding is that rhythms
of unpredictable symbols are essential to any application of the concept
of spacetime [Meas. Sci. Technol. 31 025106 (2020)]. For the future we
wonder: what role do rhythms of symbols play in animal navigation?
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J. Brian Pitts

Since Leibniz's time, Cartesian mental causation has been criticized
for violating the conservation of energy and momentum. (Nonepiphenomenalist property dualism is analogous.) Many dualist responses
clearly fail. But conservation laws have important neglected features
generally undermining the objection. Conservation is local, holding first not
for the universe, but for everywhere separately. The energy (or momentum)
in any volume changes only due to what flows through the boundaries (no
teleportation). Constant total energy holds if the global summing-up of
local conservation laws converges; it probably doesn't in reality. Energy
(momentum) conservation holds if there is symmetry, the sameness of the
laws over time (space). Thus, if there are time-places where symmetries fail
due to nonphysical influence, conservation laws fail there and then, while
holding elsewhere, such as refrigerators and stars.
Noether's converse first theorem shows that conservation laws imply
symmetries. Thus conservation trivially nearly entails the causal closure
of the physical. But expecting conservation to hold in the brain (without
looking) simply assumes the falsehood of Cartesianism. Hence Leibniz's
objection begs the question. Empirical neuroscience is another matter. So
is Einstein's General Relativity, to be discussed later.
In discussions about whether the conservation of energy and momentum
undermine Cartesian mental causation, General Relativity (GR) has
rarely been considered. But a few authors have proposed that the nonlocalizability of gravitational energy and consequent lack of physically
meaningful local conservation laws answers the conservation objection to
mental causation: conservation already fails in GR, so there is nothing for
minds to violate.
This paper is motivated by two ideas. First, one might take seriously
the fact that GR formally has an infinity of rigid symmetries of the laws
and hence, by Noether's first theorem, an infinity of conserved energies-
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momenta (thus answering Schroedinger's 1918 false-negative objection).
Second, Sean Carroll has asked (rhetorically) how one should modify the
Dirac-Maxwell-Einstein equations to describe mental causation. This paper
uses the generalized Bianchi identities to show that General Relativity tends
to exclude, not facilitate, such Cartesian mental causation. In the simplest
case, Cartesian mental influence must be spatio-temporally constant, and
hence 0. The difficulty may diminish for more complicated models. Its
persuasiveness is also affected by larger world-view considerations.
Robert Prentner

“Biological mentality” opens up a new possibility to conceive of the way
that consciousness is related to the physical world. By replacing the dualism
mind/brain with a three-stage model of the mind (robotics - “transrobotic”
mentality - consciousness), a new option arises: Perhaps, the phenomenon
of mammalian consciousness could be explained as “complexification” of a
semi-autonomous hierarchy of mental processes (or in fact “mental agents”,
since transrobotic mentality is assumed to endow such processes with literal
desires and intentions)?
This raises some questions – both analytic and synthetic. First, to
what extent is the designation “mentality” justified (over and above the
properties we could associate with computational processes), and how
far does the metaphor go? For example, does it make sense to ask about
“phenomenality”, i.e. whether “it-is-something-like” for an organism
to have transrobotic mentality? And if so, what does this tell us about
consciousness? Second, how should one understand that biological
mentality complexifies and results in conscious phenomena? Could we
construct a formal model of this process which is (i) compatible with the (e.g.
evolutionary) principles which informed the framework in the first place,
and which (ii) makes concrete empirical predictions?
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Jack Tuszynski

One aspect of the amazing functioning abilities of the human brain that is
seldom discussed is its energetic efficiency. Here, we use simple reasoning
based on time, length and energy scales to analyze the possible information
processing rates of the human brain based on the metabolic energy cost of
encoding a bit of information. We use well-known empirical information
about the brain and its constituent neurons and sub-neuronal structures to
arrive at characteristic information processing rates at all relevant scales. In
order to maintain consistent metabolic rates and clocking frequencies for
updating information content, we conclude that only coherently quantumentangled tubulin dimers in the neuron are likely to operate at a quantum
level if their functions include information storage and processing. On the
other hand, ion channels, even if unsynchronized may be able to operate
in a quantum mechanical regime. It is also relevant in this context to
invoke the concept of quantum metabolism as a consistent framework for
living systems as opposed to the highly touted quantum biology, which so
far has been lacking coherence and synchronization, properties of life in
general. Without metabolism, there is no life and without life there is no
consciousness. For this reason I believe the story of consciousness should
start with the concept of energy transduction.

